Dr. Paul White: "What is most important to anyone who wants to discuss these questions is that they do so with an open mind"
- KurdishMedia.com - By Sheri Laizer
- 06/04/2001 00:00:00
Sheri Laizer offers an introduction to Dr. Paul White and his new book "Primitive rebels or revolutionary modernisers - the Kurdish national movement in Turkey' (Zed Books, 2000)
KurdishMedia.com, 6 April 2001
The most refreshing and challenging contribution to the debate on the Kurdish question in Turkey for a long while must be Paul J.White’s new book, 'Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey’. With the publication of this book at last we have an up to date evaluation the nature of Kurdish leadership and the Kurdish movements in Turkey, the role of the PKK and its so-called creation of a "New Kurdish Person".
It is rare to find a book - academic or otherwise - as unfettered as this when it comes to the thorny issue of the Kurds in Turkey, their political institutions, their social and political relations and their image of themselves. The author must be congratulated here for having written so frankly and fairly on these issues without allowing himself to have been drawn into the quagmire of factional alignments, standing on oversensitive party-political toes - or falling into the common pitfall of many a partisan for the Kurdish cause in blinding oneself to the faults and excesses of the Cause’s adherents. To my mind it is perhaps one of the greatest strengths of this book that it has been able to highlight how devotion to the Cause by its participants has obscured many of the deeper internal issues and prevented such critical analysis as may have furthered new and creative approaches to old and persistent problems. Such ÒpartisanshipÓ has hindered the Kurdish movement in grasping real opportunities by allowing them to identify themselves as history’s victims rather than facing the situation square on.
Paul J. White examines the background of the Kurdish movement in Turkey and its political phenomena within the broad context of the ÒcultÓ and of past religious or quasi-religious structures. Its systematic, academic approach helps one to get below the surface to some of the most slippery issues hitherto camouflaged by the image of the ‘Cause.’ The book traces how the Kurdish movement in Turkey has developed from its tribal and religious roots into its present contemporary mutations: despite the overt "left-wingÓ slant of much of party political terminology, the author clearly demonstrates how the quasi-religious accretions have exerted an influential role in shaping the behaviour of both the ÒfollowersÓ and the Òprophet-likeÓ guise of the movement’s leaders.
The final chapters of the book present relevant discussions as to just what stage the Kurdish movement in Turkey has really reached. In one of these latter chapters, ÒFrom Serhildan to EuropeÓ the author observes: ÒThe first issue of the PKK’s principal publication Serxwebun after Ocalan’s capture was headlined: ‘Her Sey Kutsal Ozgurluk Savasi Icin’ - which translated literally, means ‘Everything is Sacred for our Freedom Struggle’ or, perhaps more colloquially (and less evocative of religious symbolism): ‘Anything Goes’. (Serxwebun 1999) . . . A statement by the entire PKK Central Committee (except, obviously, for Abdullah Ocalan) set the parameters for the immediate period ahead, on 18 February 1999: ÒOur people will continue to direct their anger and frustration to protest in the streets. In Europe, particular attention will be paid not to harming any civilians...Within Turkey and Kurdistan, we will not observe any such constraints, as it is the direct and illegal actions of the Turkish government that we are revolting against (PKK, 1999a)Ó p.187
The book the turns its attention to how Ocalan apparently attempts to turn all this around in ordering an end to violence (and armed struggle in its former guise) despite his solitary confinement on Imrali Island. It also examines the initial attempts by the PKK to establish a successor to Ocalan, or credible spokesperson for the party, and the emergence of the ÒPresidential CouncilÓ.
Despite the reversals of fortune, Abdullah Ocalan nonetheless continues to hang on to the PKK leadership and confounds many a commentator as he directs the party despite being physically in the hands of his former ÒenemyÓ. Redesigning his ÒPeace ProjectÓ Ocalan calls upon the Turkish State to act as ÒbrothersÓ in a ÒnewÓ era of partnership between Kurd and Turk within the bounds of a Òunited and indivisibleÓ Turkey - something looking very like that same Turkey envisaged by Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic as we know it.
I asked Paul White where he thinks all this seems to be headed:
KM: Do you see any signs of the long-awaited breakthrough for the Kurdish movement in Turkey in terms of a basic recognition of Kurdish rights per se, i.e., equal rights as Kurds with Turks, genuine human, political and legal rights?
PW: No. This is a deadly illusion. The Turkish state has a game that it plays; it has been playing this game for a long time now, and it is very good at it. Here is how it works: senior politicians, administrators or businessmen make statements saying that there is a big need for liberal reform in Turkey. This stirs up a furore in the media, with statements for and against. International commentators next contribute to this discussion, coming out strongly in favour of reform, and praising the initiative which Memed X has taken, etc. In the final analysis, little or nothing is actually achieved, but the impression is created internationally that Turkey is changing for the better. Pseudo-reforms that might sometimes be passed can so easily be ignored on the ground by the authorities. The classic example is Ozal's language reform, which supposedly makes it legal for Kurds to speak their own language in all domestic situations (that is, outside of public life). (Of course, Kurds were already doing this in private.) This has not prevented police and ÒJandarmalarÓ from beating Kurds caught speaking Kurdish to each other since the law was passed.
The current talk of reforms and liberalisation holds no more promise than earlier episodes. These are games for the amusement of Europe - and at the end of the day, Europe will be quite happy, for the most part, to turn a discreet 'blind eye' to what is really going on in Turkey, behind all the talk about democratisation. Turkey is no more capable of granting Kurds the rights you mention than it is able to permit any other non-elite layer in society to have such things. The economic and power position of the neo-Kemalist elite depends very much upon society remaining very much as it is, so why should the elite agree to undermine itself? And who will force it to do so?
KM: In what way might one be inclined to see the PKK's "New Line" as being analogous with the strategy of the Turkish Chief of Staff when it comes to reducing or even eliminating the Kurdish 'threat' to Turkish national security?
PW: If you are asking whether Abdullah Ocalan has helped the Turkish state to contain Kurdish nationalism in Turkey? Then, the answer is clearly 'yes' - although everything that Ocalan has said and done since his capture is merely a continuation of long held policies on his and the PKK's part. Certainly, there is a big change in terms of the means being used (for the moment) by the PKK, but Ocalan has been saying that the PKK could accept being part of a federated Turkey, for instance, for over 10 years.
Of course, there are already signs that the PKK - with or without Apo - might be compelled before too long to recommence its armed activities in Turkey. If that happens (and it is most probable that it will) it will be interesting to see if the PKK demands an independent Greater Kurdistan as it did briefly and initially, or sticks to the 'discount' peace program. My money would be on the latter. In any case, it is also worth noting that a PKK which broke with Abdullah Ocalan over tactics would be a very different organisation than at present; the present charismatic personality cult around Ocalan would completely disappear and the PKK would become much more like a Western political party, as Apo's charisma is routinised. The past three years have shown that the timid attempts to push forward Cemilk Bayik (and, to a much lesser extent Osman Ocalan) as a sort of poor person's surrogate Apo have not worked. But without a central charismatic leader, the PKK would also lose much of its ability to inspire young militants to go to their deaths. This is obviously a dilemma facing the PKK, which would only ever break from Ocalan (if at all) over the question of 'armed struggle'. One consequence could well be a violent splitering of the PKK, with one group (or more) pursuing 'armed struggle' and a splinter official PKK still hanging on to the one-sided 'peace process'.
KM: Abdullah Ocalan has been a prisoner on Imrali Island for some two years. In what many observers see as being a "test period" for the much vaunted peace project, in your personal and informed observation (relevant to the final chapter of your book with its examination of possible future scenarios), with the Turkish military pushing for a final solution in northern Iraq against PKK guerrillas despite the ceasefire and the troubles at home has anything been achieved thus far to establish Kurdish rights and freedoms in Turkey?
PW: Once again, nothing has been achieved and nothing really tangible is likely. Abdullah Ocalan has been totally unable to influence the course of Turkey's attitude towards its Kurds. This is even despite Ocalan virtually offering Ankara the use of his guerrillas to act as its cat's paw in Iraq. Turkey does not want to take anything openly from Abdullah Ocalan, however, as this would undermine its claim that the PKK is a spent force.
As I explain in my book, the PKK cannot turn around its declining forces without the support of a major power. But unlike in Northern Ireland (where the IRA has arguably become a virtual US ally, which Uncle Sam uses to kick Britain into line) there is currently nothing that the PKK can use to attract serious international (great power) support to its side. Russia is showing some interest, but it is a broken reed. Iran is even weaker, and on course to rapprochement wit the US anyway. Europe is powerful if it can unite, but that is proving to be very difficult - as the sharp differences over policy on ex-Yugoslavia indicate most graphically.
KM: Abdullah Ocalan claimed to have created a "new Kurdish person", one able to stand on his, or her feet, in their own right free of the old social, religious and political constraints. Yet despite 15 long years of struggle and heavy losses these new 'creatures' appear to be prepared to sacrifice everything 'gained' for the individual person of their leader. Does this not go against their leader's own teaching?
PW: Not at all. Abdullah Ocalan has posed as a sort of Kurdish prophet, and he has been accepted by many many Kurds as such. So those Kurds still enamoured of his personality are subject to strong pressures to accept whatever he says. Also, as I pointed out above, and in the book, his 'new' policies are really just an extrapolation of long held policies.
KM: Has Abdullah Ocalan's charisma and cult status as discussed in your book taken the place of the PKK's original supreme quest for national liberation which was the main object of PKK doctrine before Ocalan's capture, even to the extent that cadres had to remain celibate as they were married to Kurdistan?
PW: If you look at all the Kurdish parties in other parts of Kurdistan, you will see that all of them revolve around devotion to charismatic leaders of different sorts - the Barzanis, Talebani, the (late) Ghassemlou. So it is not completely new in Kurdistan. None of these leaders or parties have been able to deliver a free Kurdistan - and all have arguably collaborated with their enemies.
KM: If so, how has this been able to happen?
PW: The reality is that the dream of national liberation is a mirage in our era. This will shock some people, but think about it for a moment. Can anyone name one former colony that has become truly independent since World War II? Not even Vietnam managed it; it swapped French for Japanese for French for US domination, then threw out Uncle Sam, only to replace him with Russian imperialism. And, since the collapse of the USSR, the West has made a wholesale return.
The 'national liberation' movements have the wrong end of the stick; the antidote to national oppression in this day and age is social, not nationalist, in nature.
KM: Does the cult element within the PKK movement share any fundamental similarities with any other cult or political movement as defined within the structures of your book?
PW: All political cult movements are similar - to each other, and to religious cult movements and Islamist movements such as HAMAS. All involve a basic abnegation of self-consciousness; the devotee 'gives' his individuality and free will to the charismatic leader. But, shocking though this is, it this should be understood in context. When you and yours have absolutely no future, when you have seen and suffered unspeakable horrors, when you can see no way forward, it is very comforting to find a simple, straight way forward, and it is even an added bonus that this path does not involve critical thinking. So, such movements are always made up of the wretched of the earth, but this does not make them movements for progressive social change.
KM: With the PKK leader in the hands of his former enemy, given the developments over the last two years, where might this be expected to lead in your view, with the PKK side having given everything unconditionally and without guarantee?
PW: As I say above (in answer to your second question), there is a big chance that the upshot will be a violent splitering of the PKK into factions which resume the guerilla war and the official PKK which sticks to the current policy. There will be no progress in terms of the 'peace process'.
KM: Would you argue that Kurdish women have attained a new degree of independence and self-knowledge through their being Òre-shapedÓ by the PKK and its doctrines of the new person, the new "Kurdish woman", or have they been encouraged to become honorary men avoiding particular gender issues?
PW: Kurdish women who have actively participated in the Kurdish nationalist movement might well have attained a great degree of self-confidence that their normal existence (as marginalised subjects of history) would tend to permit them. However, this is not at all the same thing as 'a new degree of independence and self-knowledge', given the nature of the PKK as a cult movement, which is the deadly enemy of critical thought, let alone 'self-knowledge'. Nor am I convinced that women have 'reshaped the PKK'. What is the evidence of this? Abdullah Ocalan shocked other Kurdish nationalist parties by allowing women guerrillas to fight and by putting male and female guerrillas together in the same guerrilla units. But, in itself this is no more 'progressive' than Israeli authorities expecting young Israeli women, as well as young Israeli men, to do military service. And in the end, Apo had to end this experiment and create a separate women's army, because it simply was not working properly.
KM: Your book looks at the possibilities of a successor to Abdullah Ocalan emerging within the PKK. Predictions soon after Ocalan's capture that this might be Cemil Bayik seem to have been overtaken by events. If anything, Osman Ocalan, sharing the Ocalan name, seems to have held things together to some extent. Has the PKK become solely dependent upon Abdullah Ocalan and the concept of absolute loyalty to him as "supreme leader" and a prophetic figure?
PW: I've commented on most of this already in answer to question two. Osman Ocalan does command the respect of a section of the PKK, although he is still probably overshadowed by Cemil Bayik. Osman Ocalan's main strength, however, is his close relation with the Iranian regime. He has himself lived in Iran for some time, together with some PKK fighters.
KM: Do you forsee any sudden shifts occurring in the policies of the Kurdish movement given the inability of either the PKK, HADEP, or the voices of notable Kurdish intellectuals to provoke any of the long-sought changes in Turkey to date?
PW: The possibility of the splintering of the organisation that I have mentioned above will occur if too much time elapses without Turkey responding positively to the PKK 'peace process'. Charismatic leaderships must always be able to deliver new apparent gains or dividends from their leadership, or face the loss of their charisma.
KM: Do you think Turkey is genuine about making reforms to achieve EU membership, or does she hope to get away with it as in the past and given US support?
PW: The latter option is the case - with the added point that Turkey can expect the EU to connive with it in covering up Turkey's Kurdish reality as it has done in the past. Some individual EU member states might kick up a rumpus, however.
KM: Are there other comments you might like to make, in particular, which could be useful to this free and unfettered discussion that may largely remain taboo for Kurds themselves, whatever the reasons?
PW: What is most important to anyone who wants to discuss these questions is that they do so with an open mind.
Dr. Paul J. White
Paul J. White is a Political Scientist who teaches Middle East Politics at University in Melbourne. A Middle East specialist, he has contributed numerous articles to refereed journals. He is the author of 'Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey' (2000, Zed Books, London), and co-editor of the book 'Remaking the Middle East' (1997, Berg Publishers, Oxford & New York). Together with a colleague in the Netherlands, Joost Jongerden, he is currently preparing an edited collection for publication, entitled 'Turkey's Alevi Enigma'. He is a member of the Editorial Board of the 'Journal of Arabic, Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies' and serves on the board of directors of the Kurdish Institute, in Washington.
- KurdishMedia.com - By Sheri Laizer
- 06/04/2001 00:00:00