The role and diplomacy of non-state actors: Case study on Kurds in Iraq

  • KurdishMedia.com - By Shahla Waliy
  • 30/08/2008 00:00:00

Introduction

It is generally recognized that the process of building a capable state requires the participation of all the vital forces of a nation. A capable state is one that has all the attributes of a modern, strong, responsible and responsive state, a state capable of effectively delivering security, peace, prosperity and other public goods to its people.[1] Within the state structures and tools; Diplomacy in turn is “the profession of persuasion”[2] and hence the task of Diplomacy/Diplomats in state building is to “nonviolent advancement of the political, economic, cultural and military interests of their state and people,”[3] in addition to fulfilling states’ duties, relations, and commitments with the International community using Diplomacy as a powerful means. Although the state is usually considered the focal point of this process, other sectors, including non-state ones, have an important role to play, and the importance of this role has grown significantly over the past couple of decades. Authoritarian states in general tends to use aggression to force its authority upon its people and also it diminish the role of non-state actor to its minimum if not oppress them brutally as in the case of Iraq’s governments and its relation with Kurds movement.

This paper will try to identify these other actors and recognize those areas where they contribute to the process of state-building. The bulk of the paper will deal with the role of Kurds in Iraq as both state and non-state actors, and their distinct evolution into an official regional government. The Iraqi Kurds are considered to a) have an essential role in the process of Iraq’s formation as a state, b) have struggled since day one to gain their independence, using diplomatic and non-diplomatic approaches, c) have been dealt with by foreign countries and international superpowers throughout Iraq’s history as an important faction that affects Iraq’s political process, d) powerfully emerged from non-state actor into a government and state actor that both possesses the influence to shape modern Iraqi politics, and also wields that power effectively in building a new Iraq.

The Concept of Non-State Actors

The concept of Non-State Actors has been addressed worldwide in the past couple decades, as researchers, activists, politicians and mediators have sought to comprehend and recognize its importance [4]. Non- State Actors may generally be subsumed under civil society organizations, although there are some essential differences that distinguish Non-State Actors from the civil society organizations.[5]

Civil society is a concept which, although ancient in origin, has seen more frequent usage over the past three decades, and its current usage, emphasizing its non-state character, is far from features it was given by ancient philosophers, when it was considered as part of the states.

Michael Edwards finds that “Civil Society has become a notoriously slippery concept, used to justify radically different ideological agendas, supported by deeply ambiguous evidence and suffused with many questionable assumptions.” [6] He goes on to state that Civil Society, at least in its operation, has created a “third sector” – that part of society that fills the gap between the family and the state, a space wherein the “habits of the heart”, including such attitudes and values as cooperation, non-violence and trust are privileged and nurtured, thus helping to foster “a different rationality, identified as civil.” [7] Inherent in this order is the primacy of the position of the citizen in the mediation of social relations unrestricted by the coercive force of the State or the hostility of private sector. Conceived in the general framework of resistance against State-sponsored dictatorship, the notion of Civil Society was given a new momentum during and after the collapse of the Soviet bloc.

Ironically, the new strength of the civil society movement has also come about as a result of what has been termed “retrenchment and privatization” of the State; the erosion of the traditional power of the state in the wake of “rapid global market integration, increased mobility of people and capital and rapid social and technological change.” [8] These developments have been accompanied by the breakdown of the traditional welfare state, trade unions and the nuclear family, going away with the conventional safety nets, and leading to heightened levels of uncertainty and feelings of vulnerability, creating a need for new forms of organization to fill up the vacuum left behind by these rapid transformations.

Non-Government Organizations, NGOs, is probably the most recognizable category, and having been on the scene for longest time. These are mostly single-issue organizations, engaged either in development activities or in advocacy work. In development work they tend to be restricted in scope, operating in small geographical areas, covering small groups of people. In single issue advocacy, they have chosen problems close to the heart of the founders, such as rural poverty, women and children rights, etc.

Some NGOs have chosen to serve more broad-based constituencies, such as when they cover multifaceted areas like human rights, general gender issues, poverty, development forums, political liberalization, economic liberalization, etc. Sometimes they have tapped into the knowledge base of single issue and association, which has helped them to present a more holistic picture of NGO activities at national or regional/international level. These may include, in an urban setting, “Christian and Islamic religious associations, ethnic associations, women’s organizations, professional associations, employers’ and occupational bodies, student and youth groups, cooperative/mutual help groups, special interest groups such as human rights associations”. [9]

Many of these NGOs are headed by urban-based educated elites, with ties to donor agencies and use the development speech favored by donors, which gives them easy access to funding and linkages with their International counterparts.

It may be fair to state that some civil society organizations do not sit well within the term NGO, even if they do certainly share many attributes with the NGOs, such as being, simply, non-governmental. Media is one of this, if not the most important, organizations.

Media is instrumental in sensitizing public opinion against corruption, offering a platform to political and social views previously muscled and helping to curb impunity in issues of human rights abuses.

Faith Based Organizations are another type of Non-State Actors that do not fit under NGOs accurately. They are systematized around a confessional community; they help members of their congregations to get together and pool resources, including sharing ideas, to tackle common problems. Their activities may include adult literacy classes; training in basic trades and skills. Their basic financial sustenance is assured by the confessional centre around which they operate – church, mosque, etc. – although often they contribute small sums towards the realization of their own projects [10].

Armed Group Non State Actor

Armed groups are one of the most important and strongest types of Non-State Actors. Different armed groups have had different reasons for taking up arms, to fight either against their states or against other non-state groups. Most times the issue in conflict has been the perceived exclusion of sections of the population from full enjoyment of citizenship rights, including participation in governance systems or access to resources, and a belief that another group or groups are having the lion’s share of the ‘national cake’.

Quite often in these conflicts the success of an armed group in marshalling support will depend on the legitimacy of their claims as assessed by members of their groups as well as the goals that the advantages members of such groups hopes to obtain by joining up or giving support.

Kurds as Non State Actor “Rebellion”

After WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the state of Iraq was brought into being by politicians and statesmen in 1920, when Iraq was put under the British Mandate. As a state builder the British developed an impressive array of institutions like; a parliament, western style constitution, bureaucracy and the army. However; Iraq never settled into these institutions, as it has consistently ignored rights and recognitions of its constituencies’ diversity. Throughout its history and successive governments, Iraq witnessed many coup d'état, insurgencies, and revolutions that shook its security and halted it from progress.

Diplomacy, as an important aspect of developing peace on both domestic and international levels, was never an integral part of the doctrine of Iraq’s governments. Thus the brutality in suppressing the Kurds is well known in modern history, atrocities like Halabja (in one chemical attack against Kurdish village of Halabjah in March 1988, Saddam’s regime killed as many as 5,000 civilians) and campaigns code-named Anfal (Arabic: “Spoils”) in which an estimation between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed by Iraqi forces during a series of these campaigns in 1988, [11] are considered to be one of the most appalling episodes in Iraq’s history.

Kurdish Evolution from non-state to state actors

Historical Background of Kurds in Iraq:

Kurds are a nation of more than 30 million people divided among six countries, primarily in what is now northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey and with smaller numbers in northeastern Syria, northwestern Iran and the Caucuses. They are the world’s largest nation without a state [12]. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, KURDS are:

Member of an ethnic and linguistic group native to parts of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Kurds speak one of two dialects of Kurdish, a West Iranian language related to Modern Persian. Traditionally nomadic, most were forced into farming by the redrawing of state borders after World War I (1914–18).[13]

The same encyclopedia defines Kurdistan as, “The name Kurdistan (“Land of the Kurds”) refers to an area that roughly includes the mountain systems of the Zagros and the eastern extension of the Taurus. Since very early times the area has been the home of the Kurds. For 600 years after the Arab conquest and their conversion to Islam, the Kurds played a recognizable and considerable part in the troubled history of western Asia. Among the Kurdish dynasties that arose during this period the most important were the Shaddadids, ruling a predominantly Armenian population in the Ani and Ganja districts of Transcaucasia (951–1174); the Marwanids of Diyarbakir (990–1096); and the Hasanwayhids of Dinavar in the Kermanshah region (959–1015). Less is written of the Kurds under the Mongols and Turkmens, but they again became prominent in the wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Dynasty. Several Kurdish principalities developed and survived into the first half of the 19th century, notably those of Bohtan, Hakari, Bahdinan, Soran, and Baban in Turkey and of Mukri and Ardelan in Persia” .[14]

Iraqi Kurds are often characterized as seeing themselves as victims, as Kurds’ struggle for self-determination has been hampered by the bitter rivalry between competing nationalist groups, some of which have been used as pawns by regional powers as well as international powers like the United States. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points sparked the first Kurdish diplomatic ties with the United States, through a Kurdish delegation (consisting of local figures and intellectuals) to the Paris peace conference of 1919 [15]. One of President Wilson’s fourteen points stipulated that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be “assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” [16], and so Kurdish nationalists looked to the eventual establishment of a Kurdistani state, which recognizes the right of Kurds to self-determination.

Wilson pledged to support the creation of the Kurdistan state within two years. This promise, however, was soon forgotten as Western powers (Britain and France) applied their own treaties and competed to control the region; when the borders of the Middle East were redrawn, the Kurds were left out. The 1920 Sevres Treaty clearly gave the Kurds the right to claim independence, Article 64 of the treaty states: “If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 [i.e., Turkey] shall address themselves to the council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas independence from Turkey, and if the council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independent and recommends that is should granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas” , one of Severs articles also mentions; “No objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mousel valiyet”[18] but these articles were never ratified, and Severs was replaced by the treaty of Lausanne (1923), which made no mention of Kurdistan or of the Kurds. Thus the opportunity to unify the Kurds in a nation of their own was lost.

Indeed, Kurdistan after the war was more fragmented than before, and various separatist movements arose among Kurdish groups.[19] The Final stab to the Kurdish self-determination movement was made when Iraq became independent in 1931, and no special arrangement was made for the Kurds. The Kurdish revolution occurred and continued in Iraq for the periods of 1931–1932 and 1944–1945.

Although the pressure for Kurds to assimilate was less intense in Iraq (where the Kurdish language and culture have been freely practiced), government repression has been extremely brutal. Therefore, armed rebellions occurred in, and a low-level armed insurgency took place throughout the 1960s under the command of Mustafa Al-Barzani leader of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (IKDP), who had been an officer of the Republic of Mahabad [20].

The next significant diplomatic contact between the United States and the Kurds was in the 1960s, when the United States was pressuring the Shah of Iran, and began supporting the Kurds as a political tool in that effort. When Saddam began rising as a threat, Iraqi Kurds resisted and held out with assistance from Iran, Israel and the United States, which had sent CIA agents to arm and train the Peshmerga. By 1975, Kissinger had secretly channeled $16 million of military aid to the Kurds, who believed that Washington was finally supporting their right to self-determination. But these alliances proved to be fragile [21]. In 1975, Saddam agreed to settle a border dispute with Iran if the Shah of Iran would cut off his support for the Kurdish fighters. The Nixon administration, which had seen the Kurds as a buffer to both the Iraqis and the Soviets, also withdrew its aid. Saddam's army regained control of northern Iraq, continuing its campaign of ethnic cleansing and massive human rights abuses.

A congressional report later concluded that the United States and the Shah had not wanted the Kurds to succeed. The Kurds were never aware that they were being used as pawns in a geopolitical game. "Even in the context of covert operations, ours was a cynical enterprise," the report concluded. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was unremorseful about what many Kurds saw as betrayal: “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.[22] ” As Iraq wiped out the remaining rebels, the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani sent a message to Kissinger: "Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way, with silence from everyone. We feel, your Excellency, that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our people, who have committed themselves to your country's policy." Kissinger, however, did not send a reply. Deeply disheartened, Mustafa Barzani (who had worked with the US and was then considered the leader of Kurdish independence and autonomy efforts) went into exile in the United States. Before his death in 1979, he wondered plaintively, “Have the Kurdish people committed such crimes that every nation in the world should be against them?”[23]

A failed peace accord with the Iraqi government led to another outbreak of fighting in 1975, but the Algeria accord between Iraq and Iran led to a collapse of Kurdish resistance. Thousands of Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey. Low-intensity fighting followed. In the late 1970s, Iraq's Ba'ath Party instituted a policy of settling Iraqi Arabs in parts of Kurdistan—particularly around the oil-rich city of Kirkuk—and uprooting Kurds from those same regions [24]. This policy accelerated in the 1980s, as large numbers of Kurds were forcibly relocated, particularly from areas along the Iranian border. As mentioned above most brutal atrocities were conducted systematically by the Ba’ath regime during Halabja and Anfal, but this does not mean other type of brutalities and human rights abuses did not occurred apart from these two operations. The regime and its terrifying intelligence agencies played a significant role in detaining and killing young Kurdish activists.

Despite these attacks and atrocities, the Kurds again rebelled following Iraq's defeat in the First Persian Gulf War (1990–1991) but were again brutally suppressed—sparking another mass exodus. This time the Kurd uprising started by bombing Ba’ath Party’s offices and headquarters in Rania “one of Kurdistan towns on its East” on March 6, 1991. The Kurdish rebellions known as Peshmerga “(Kurdish: pêsmerge) is the term used by Kurds to refer to armed Kurdish fighters. Literally meaning "those who face death" (pês front + merg death e is) the peshmerga forces of Kurdistan have been around since the advent of the Kurdish independence movement in the early 1920s”[25] controlled most of Kirkuk by March 14 1991 “the place some call Kurdistna’s Jerusalem”[26] .

This uprising was different form other revolutions and uprisings in that it controlled most of the Kurdistani region and made quite strong progress, still it collapsed and again by the United States decision to change allies. In President H.W Bush’s speech on February 14, 1991, he claimed, “And there is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then comply with the United Nations resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations” [27] , which sparked uprisings all over Iraq, particularly because Kurds believed that the United States would support in toppling Saddam’s regime.

After the 1991 uprising collapsed, the Iraqi troops moved to Kurdistan and Saddam gained control again. Geopolitics was more important to the United States to secure the long term balance of power in the Gulf, and thus it was important at that time to keep Saddam in power.[28] As Bush Sr. and his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, later explained: “While we hoped that popular revolt or a coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf.”[29]

After the war, the U.S. and Britain unilaterally established no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq, to protect the Kurds and the Shiites. Another positive intervention by the United States during the 1990s, implemented by the Clinton administration this time, came with 1998 Washington Agreement. KDP and PUK representatives met in Washington in the fall of 1998, and since then “the United States continued to protect the Kurds and a major focus on human rights in Iraq helped prevent a return to the same level of mass killings that took place in 1980s and early 1990s”[30] .

The Final episode in the Kurdish struggle as rebellion came with the significant U.S. involvement with the Kurds in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where Kurdish peshmerga aided the U.S.-led invasion.

Kurds as State Actors, the Kurdistan Regional Government

In April 1991, the Kurdistan Region became essentially self-governing when a large territory, about 7000 square miles, was secured by the peshmerga in the battle of Kore , north of Erbil and Aznar Mountain, east of Suliamanyha, defeating the Iraqi tanks. Through the efforts of the United States and others to establish a safe haven and no-fly zone, another 3000 square miles were added to the territories under the Kurds’ control.

The Kurdistan Regional government, KRG, was convened as a result of the 1992 election, which was the first fully democratic election held in Iraq. However; the power sharing agreement between the two powerful parties (KDP and PUK) fell apart in 1994, and in 1996 a civil war broke out.

Diplomacy played an important role here to save Kurdistan and its fragile government. The United States under the Clinton administration brokered a permanent agreement between KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party, headed by Masoud Barzani) and PUK (Patriotic United Kurdistan, headed by Jalal Talabani). One of profound features of these two administrations, is the total understanding that this awkward situation should comes into an end, yet with gradual steps avoiding further clashes and conflicts in the exhausted region.

Meanwhile and during his iron fist regime, Saddam cut off Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq in both military and economic terms. Saddam Hussein refused to supply Kurdistan power, water, trade, food, or any of the essentials of life. It was a time of great struggle and great challenge for the Kurdish people. Kurdistan was free in many ways, but was deprived, hungry and barely able to create the conditions for life.

However; the Kurdistan regional government made good use of the twelve years of freedom under US and British protection and impressed the world with their ambition to begin the first steps toward democracy and free enterprise system. Their achievements were breathtaking and promising for the Kurdish people, they succeeded to: 1) build two thousands schools between 1992-2003, 2) open two universities in Dahuk and Suliemanyha, and Kurdistan new doctors are now qualified by the British Medical Board, c) rebuild the four thousand villages destroyed by Saddam in the 1970s and 1980s, d) recover rich agricultural lands, e) start important environmental programs with the aid of United Nations to reforestation of Kurdistan mountains burned and denuded for years .

KRG understood the importance of the civil Society and this notion started to gain support and intention of the Kurdish society. This is enhanced by the international aid and sympathy the Kurdish obtained during the 1991 uprising. International civil society organizations won love and respect from the Kurdish people for their important role to draw attention to the Humanitarian crises emerged during the catastrophic mass fled of Kurdish families into the mountain at borders of Iran and Turkey in 1991.

In nowadays Kurdistan, NGOs became very powerful part of civil society. Many centers, institutions and associations have been established working with different UN agencies like UNOPS, UNHABITAT, which provided valuable projects, in particular for the refugees and returnees of the destroyed villages of Kurdistan.

NGOs concern with gender and human rights issues are very popular in the region; like Ronahee, and Khatuzeen in Erbil, Kurdish version of Save Children in Suliamanyah. These NGOs have started working since 1991 and proved to be active partners of international NGOs, USAID and UN agencies. They have implemented numerous projects and programs in the region, such as several phases of IDP resettlement and rehabilitation projects for the IDPs (Internally Displaced People) in partnership with UNHCR.

As mentioned above women are on top priority for NGOs activities in Kurdistan, for instance; in successive efforts to empower Kurdish women and provide a strong platform for the rest of women in Iraq, Global Justice Center, a New York-based legal NGO, has launched a legal training course in Erbil, the Iraqi Kurdistan's capital, in cooperation with Kurdish Women’s Rights Watch on December 7 2007. The training will “inform participants how to enhance the rights of women through the alignment of local laws with international standards”[33] .

Media has seen its importance exponentially rise during the liberalization of Kurdistan after 1991. Before that media was in hands of the dictatorship and its agencies, today with introducing of Satellite TV and nemours accessible channels, Governments whether in Kurdistan or the rest of Iraq cannot control Media, however still have sponsored channels like Kurdistan TV or KurdSat TV. KRG has opened-door policy for the minorities to launch their own radios and TV channels.

Over years followed the 1998 peace agreement initiated by the United States, the two administrations of Suliamanyha and Erbil increased cooperation till end of 2002 when the PUK return to the Kurdistan national Assembly and this democratic body re-functioned as the legislature for the entire region. As a final step, in the process of building a regional government and transforming rebellion Non-State actors into a government administration through democratic process within the national assembly, the KDP and PUK jointly supported Massoud Barzani nomination for president of Kurdistan. Then in 2006 a unified cabinet was formed under Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani [34].

In 2003 war, the Kurds decided to be firmly on the American side and they were the most enthusiastic partner in this war. Peshmarga casualties were more than any other American ally. The Kurds played an important role to solve the crisis resulted from the refusal of Turkish Parliament to give permission for the American 4th Infantry Division to open a second front in Iraq’s north. Peshmerga units backed by American Special Forces defeated Iraqi divisions and entered Mosul and Kirkuk [35].

When Iraq’s liberation became complete with the multi-national intervention in 2003, Iraqi Kurds had a living, breathing microcosm of a democracy that all of Iraq could embrace.

Summary about the Structure of the KRG

[36]According to Kurdistan Region’s laws as enacted by the democratically elected Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exercises executive power and the current government, led by Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, assumed office on 7 May 2006.

The government consists of a coalition of political parties that reflects the diversity of the Region’s people, who are in addition to the Kurds as majority, also includes; Chaldeans, Assyrians, Turkmen, Yazidis, and others living together in harmony and tolerance.

In addition to the main two parties KDP and PUK, there are several active parties working freely in Kurdistan region, and those parties form the coalition government along with KDP and PUK, examples would be; Kurdistan Toilers Party, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, Kurdistan Islamic Union, Kurdistan Communist Party, the Islamic Group and the Turkman Brotherhood Party. Among the cabinet members are a Chaldean, an Assyrian, a Yezidi, a Faili (Shia Kurd) and an independent Turkoman.

The broad-based coalition government is made up of 27 ministries and nine ministers without portfolio. The government is based in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region. It administers the governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniah and Dohuk.

The KRG established the Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) to conduct relations with the international community. Today, the DFR is an integral part of the government, with a wide ranging portfolio of responsibilities and representatives across the world.

One of the DFR’s principal charges is to organize and strengthen links with Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad to work in concert to further activities and representatives abroad.

The DFR is considered to be the main point of contact between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the many offices maintained by foreign governments in Erbil. The DFR also oversees the activities of the foreign representative offices maintained by the KRG around the world. It is charged with assessing the effectiveness of these offices, and with developing a strategic plan for KRG representation abroad.

The governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States are main diplomatic missions in the capital of the Kurdistan Region.

DFR is responsible for organizing and executing the visits of political and business delegations to the Region. To promote direct foreign investment in the Region, the DFR works closely with the Kurdistan Region Board of Investment to ensure visiting business delegations receive a complete package of service.

Finally DFR has representatives in CIS countries, United Arab Emirates, Austria, European Union, France, Germany, Nordic countries, Spain and Portugal, Switzerland, Poland, UK, Poland, USA, and Australia.

Endnotes

1. Charles W. Freeman, Arts of power: statecraft and diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, c1997), 3.

2. Ibid, 4.

3. Ibid.

4. Michael Edwards, Civil Society(2004) Polity Press.

5. Ibid.

6. Michael Edwards, Civil Society(2004) Polity Press.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Helen, James, ed., Civil society, religion and global governance: paradigms of power and persuasion” (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007).

10. Helen, James, ed., Civil society, religion and global governance: paradigms of power and persuasion” (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007).

11. Kurd." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. .

12. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 148.

13. Kurdistan. (2007). In Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9046469

14. Kurdistan. (2007). In Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9046469

15. Kurdistan Regional Government Representative office in Washington, DC.

16. Walter, LaFeber, The American age: United States foreign policy at home and abroad since 1750 (New York: Norton, c1994), 309-310.

17. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 150.

18. Ibid.

19. Kurdistan Regional Government Representative office in Washington, DC.

20. Kurdistan Regional Government Representative office in Washington, DC

21. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 147.

22. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 148

23. Ibid.

24. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 147.

25. Kurdistan. (2007). In Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9046469

26. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 49.

27. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 44.

28. Ibid, 53-58.

29. Ibid, 58

30. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 68.

31. Ibid, 154.

32. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 157.

33. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/12/independentstate1810.htm

34. Peter, W. Galbraith, The end of Iraq : how American incompetence created a war without end ( New York : Simon & Schuster, c2006), 156.

35. Ibid, 158-159.

36. http://krg.org/

Bibliography

Freeman, Chas W. Arts of power: statecraft and diplomacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, c1997.

Edwards ,Michael. Civil Society(2004) Polity Press

James, Helen, ed. Civil society, religion and global governance: paradigms of power and persuasion (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007)

LaFeber, Walter. The American age: United States foreign policy at home and abroad since 1750. New York: Norton, c1994.

Galbraith, Peter W. The end of Iraq: how American incompetence created a war without end. New York: Simon & Schuster, c2006.

Kurdistan Regional Government Representative office in Washington, DC.

Http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/12/independentstate1810.htm

Kurdistan. (2007). In Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9046469

Kurd." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. .

Http://krg.org/

  • KurdishMedia.com - By Shahla Waliy
  • 30/08/2008 00:00:00